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REVIEW

Voice Versus Exit in Health Care Policy
M. Todd Henderson
Abstract: This essay uses the recent controversy over President Obama’s
mandate that insurance companies provide generous birth control coverage to explore larger issues about the optimal locus of health care decision making. Mandates may be justified in some instances, but they
sacrifice choice and local variation and perhaps lead to worse social outcomes. The key question for policy makers is whether market processes
or rule by expert is more likely to strike the right balance of choice and
mandate.
Key Words: law and economics, federalism, health care policy,
birth control
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eorgetown University law student Sandra Fluke briefly was
the center of the health care debate in this country when
she testified before Congress in favor of President Obama’s proposal to require insurance companies to provide generous benefits
for birth control costs. Some religious institutions, like churches,
hospitals, universities, and charities, criticized the proposal on
grounds of religious freedom. Ms Fluke characterized the issue
as one of respect and fair treatment for women, citing examples
of bad outcomes that allegedly flowed to individuals denied insurance coverage for birth control. Name-calling and exaggerated claims of doom and gloom then gripped both sides. This
essay uses the debate about birth control to explore some larger
issues about health care policy in the United States, most of
which were lost in the firestorm about religion and feminism.

WHO PAYS FOR BIRTH CONTROL?
Putting aside the (large and important) issues of religious
conscience and the First Amendment, the issue is a simple one:
who should pay for birth control? At first blush, one might reasonably conclude that the individual consuming the birth control should pay for it. In a capitalist economy, most individuals
pay for the things they consume. If the average person wants
cable television, the money for it must come out of his or her
pocket, not someone else’s. To be sure, there are subsidies for
the very poor, like food stamp programs, but even the worst off in
our society generally bear most of the costs of recurring monthly
expenses. This is especially true for rather trivial expenses, like
birth control (about $10 per month for a generic prescription).
This is not to say that there is no one who cannot afford birth
control, clearly there is. The big question is whether this should
be paid for via health insurance or some other means. Insurance
seems like an odd fit for a small, predictably recurring expense
like birth control. Insurance is usually thought of as a risk-sharing
mechanism for unforeseeable expenses. I insure my car against
loss but not the costs I incur to refill it with fuel each week.
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Although we might expect most individuals to pay for
their own birth control, most insurance companies cover birth
control, and the president has proposed that all be required to
do soVwhy? There are several possibilities. Importantly, each
of them is simply a reflection of the aggregated desires of individuals in the common poolVthat is, the insured. Insurance
companies provide services their customers value in a way that
tries to maximize the value of the business; governments try to
do the same for the welfare of society as a whole.
Obviously, those who plan to use birth control would
want an insurance company to subsidize the purchase price by
making others who were not planning to use it pay some or all
of the price. Everyone likes getting something for nothing. But
whether they can get it depends on the number of people wanting to use birth control, the number of people not wanting to,
and the ability of insurance companies to create viable businesses for just the latter group. For instance, if nonusers are not
a separable insurance pool and users are important customers,
then a cross-subsidy might arise. In addition, the nonusers may
not object to paying for users’ birth control because the additional
costs to them will be trivial, so long as the ratio of users to nonusers is not too high. Most nonusers (eg, men) probably do not
even know whether their insurance plan covers birth control;
those who do may be married and, therefore, effectively a user
from an economic standpoint.
But there is a reason even nonusers of birth control might
be willing to pay for birth control for others: doing so may be
cheaper than not doing so, given that the insurance will likely
cover the medical costs of not using birth control. Babies are
more expensive than their prophylaxes. Covering birth control
may economize on total expected payments and therefore allows
the insurance company to offer lower rates. This reason is about
the costs of insurance for all insured, not just expected users of
birth control.
Making others pay for an individual’s birth control on this
ground must be based on an assumption that the individual will
not pay for it herself out of her own funds. This is an economically irrational decision if one does not want a baby or would
experience negative health consequences as a result of not using
birth control. But individuals might overweigh a current expenditure and discount future ones (eg, childrearing) and therefore
consume less than the optimal amount of birth control. If others
in the same insurance pool believe birth control will be underconsumed, for whatever reason, if not covered by insurance, then
they would agree to pay for someone else’s birth control to lower
their own premiums. This is true whether or not one expects to
consume birth control in the future. And it should, as a purely
economic matter, be independent of one’s views about the propriety of birth control. But perhaps those who are opposed to
birth control would be happy to pay for the costs of not using it,
even at a high level, given that they put such a negative value
on paying for the birth control and such a high value on producing any children.
For those with idiosyncratically strong preferences about
sexual matters of others, whether for religious or other reasons,
they can find out whether various insurance plans cover birth control and then choose accordingly. If there are sufficiently large
numbers of such people, they could form an actuarially significant
www.pathologycasereviews.com
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pool such that the plan could exclude payment for birth control.
And, in any event, the prices of insurance should reflect individuals’ willingness to pay for the basket of services offered.
If there are individuals who do not want to pay for birth control,
the price they pay for insurance may be higher because there
may be more births or other medical costs that result. The price
difference between two plans, one of which offers birth control
and one that does not, should reflect the value of this idiosyncratic preference. Choices should be priced by the market. In a
reasonably functioning marketVthat is, one with competition and
information available to purchasersVthose who do not want to
cover birth control should bear the costs of that decision.
The reason for government involvement is to remedy any
market failure. So far, we have seen two possibilities. First, if
individuals are too poor to afford birth control or are irrational
(ie, not making smart economic decisions in the long run), they
may underconsume birth control relative to their private and
the social optimum. Second, if the market is not providing insurance alternatives such that preferences are priced, then individuals may find themselves either coerced into a plan that
does not offer them what they want or those who have idiosyncratic preferences about others’ sexual behaviors might not
have to bear the full costs of those preferences.
In the first case, the solution is to lower the cost for individuals by having other people pay. If the problem is purely one
of money, then this can be done easily by taxing rich people
and giving money to poor people. Milton Friedman called this
approach a ‘‘negative income tax,’’ meaning direct payments
to individuals to get them to at least a minimum income level.
The idea would be to guarantee income and then harness the
power of individuals acting in markets to deliver the socially
optimal level and type of goods and services. This assumes that,
with the money, poor people would make rational decisionsVfor
example, pay $10 per month for birth control to avoid having
to drop out of school or leave work and bear the huge costs of
(unwanted) child rearing. Of course, if the assumption is that
poor people are irrational, then this approach might not work.
In that case, a better approach might be to artificially lower the
cost through an insurance mandate to cover birth control. Note
two things about this approach, however. First, it still assumes
some rationality. A mandate that insurance companies offer it
does not compel that individuals consume it. Second, unless tied
to an income level, the result is not just a subsidy from nonusers
to poor users, but to all users.
The second type of market failure could be the lack of
competition or the ability of some to externalize costs onto
others. Pollution is the classic case. If a factory does not have
to pay for the environmental damage it inflicts on a local stream,
the factory will produce more than the socially optimal level.
Effective environmental regulation is about forcing the factory
to pay all of its costs and therefore optimize output. Without
law, either command-and-control regulation of outputs or lawsuits by injured parties, we would privilege those firms or individuals who are best at making other people pay, not those who
are the most efficient producers.
This logic obtains for both users and nonusers of birth
control. If women do not use birth control but can make others
in the insurance pool pay for their child birth and other associated costs of child rearing, then they will engage in an inefficient
level of production, just like the polluting factory. On the other
hand, nonusers with idiosyncratic preferencesVthat is, those who
discount these child-related costs because they value highly the
control over others’ sexual practices or value babies highlyV
will only make sensible decisions if the costs of this approach
are fully born by them.
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The best approach to this problem is to create a robust
competitive market where insurance companies offer a variety
of baskets of services. If there is only a single insurance company in a particular location, all people desiring insurance have
no choice but to accept the basket offered by that company.
For some, it will be optimal; for others, it will not, and the losses
suffered by this group in terms of their satisfaction will be gained
by others in the insurance pool or the insurance company. It is
for this reason that some health care reform advocates have focused on the ability of insurance firms to sell across state lines
and other reforms that would increase market competition.
We have seen so far that there may be a compelling case
for either private or public cross-subsidization of birth control. However, there is a big difference between the logic and
the practical effect of insurance company cross-subsidies and
government-mandated ones.

WHO DECIDES?
Governments and insurance companies both offer risksharing pools. In theory, citizens pay taxes that subsidize others
to make everyone better off; insured individuals pay premiums
that improve the welfare of others in the insurance pool. Two
things are notable. First, government mandates will, by definition, have the potential to reduce social welfare in that they tolerate fewer choices. Imagine there are 100 individuals buying
insurance. Half the people prefer a plan that covers birth control and half do not, whether it is for moral, ethical, or economic
reasons. If these two groups create a viable risk pool, we can
imagine insurance policies tailored to deliver to them their preferences. A government mandate would necessarily make half
the people (the ones who prefer no coverage) worse off, while
not necessarily improving the welfare of the other half.
Of course, if there is a large number of individuals who
desire coverage (whether or not they can pay) who are unable
to sort into these two policies, then a mandate might make sense.
This would only be true, if the gains to the people who get the
coverage are greater than the losses to the people who harmed
by providing it. (This could be the case, for example, if society
puts a low value on individuals trying to control others’ birth
control choices.) The point is simply that government mandates
tolerate less local variation, which leads to fewer choices and
potential destruction of social welfare. The government could
mandate all cable companies to show only PBS, and this would
likely make some people better off, but it would make many
more worse off. Less ambitiously, the government could simply
require all cable companies to carry PBS regardless of demand.
But this cross-subsidy from watchers of PBS to nonwatchers
would be justified only if the PBS watchers would be otherwise unable to watch PBS and the gain from doing so exceeded
the cost of the cross-subsidy.
The important takeaway here, however, is that any decision, by either a government or an insurance company, to create
a cross-subsidy is based on an imperfect assessment of whether
or not the transfer is in fact welfare enhancing. But there is
a big difference along this dimension between governments and
insurance companies. Governments make one-size-fits-all decisions based on the opinions of experts, whereas markets operate
based on the tacit knowledge of hundreds of millions of individual actors. While command-and-control can make sense in some
cases, what Fredrich Hayek called the ‘‘knowledge problem’’
will plague any attempts to answer complicated questions based
on limited information available to experts. We will return to
this issue in a moment.
But there is another problem that is revealed starkly by the
birth control flap. That difference has to do with what Albert O.
* 2012 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins
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Hirschman called the choice between ‘‘voice’’ and ‘‘exit.’’1 Individuals have these two choices to influence the world around
them. First, individuals can exercise ‘‘voice,’’ that is, some direct
control over the goods or services they are offered. Voting,
whether it is for representation or directly on an issue, is the
classic manifestation of voice. Individuals, say parents in a school
district, can vote for individuals to represent their interests on
the school board or they can vote directly on a particular spending or curriculum issue. This is representative versus direct democracy, and there are arguments for both in various contexts.
Second, individuals can ‘‘exit,’’ that is, express their preferences about a particular policy offered by a particular institution by choosing to have their desires satisfied elsewhere.
Customer choice is the classic manifestation of exit. If one has
a bad meal at a restaurant, one does not try to get the chef
replaced or seek input into the recipes used; one simply goes
to another restaurant. Although this seems a silly example, exit
is the primary way we shape our lives. Voice is the exception
and only used in cases in which exit is unavailable or very costly.
The interplay between voice and exit is crucial to understanding how the birth control controversy implicates larger
issues in health policy. In other contexts, we see that voice
and exit work as rough substitutes for each other. Where individuals have lots of exit options, then we do not expect them
to exercise much voice. Individuals will not demand it and we
will not observe it in practice. The restaurant example above
shows this point, but it is an easy case. Consider instead a case
in which the individuals exercising voice or exit are not just
customers but owners of the institution in question.
Corporate America is such a place. Holders of shares in
large American corporations have very little power over how
those firms operate, although shareholders literally own the company. Shareholders elect the board of directors, which governs
the firm, but these elections are more like elections in North
Korea than North Dakota. Board members are handpicked by
the CEO and are very rarely replaced. Shareholders also do not
have much, if any, say on corporate policies or decisions. Why
is there so little voice for corporate owners?
The reason is that exit costs are so low. Ownership stakes
in firms are readily transferable at extremely low cost. Shares
of large companies are traded in highly liquid public markets,
like the New York Stock Exchange, and shares can be sold
online through discount brokers, like E-Trade, for a few dollars
per trade. In addition, there is no market for any particular
stock; there is just a market for the risk-return tradeoff offered
by each stock, for which there is an infinite number of alternative combinations. Therefore, stocks look like restaurants. The
rational thing for a shareholder in a company that makes a
bad decision to do is to sell the stock and buy another company
instead. This can be done for less than $10, compared with the
enormous expense and uncertainty involved in trying to change
corporate policy.
Some companies, however, do not trade in liquid markets,
and therefore, selling shares is much more costly. Small, closely
held firms are in this group because ownership is usually concentrated in a family, and there are restrictions on who can sell,
when, and how much. As such, we would expect, and do see,
much more active roles in governance played by the shareholders
in these firms. These shareholders demand voice because the
costs of exit are high.
The consequence for these corporations with illiquid shares
and more shareholder voice is conflict. The corporate law casebooks are filled with disputes among rival owners, typically
family members, squabbling intensely about the governance
choices of small firms. While large, publicly traded firms rise
* 2012 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins
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and fall as stock is bought and sold based on individual investor
sentiment, small, closely held firms frequently find themselves
in court fighting over corporate policy.
Hirschman’s logic can be extended to the political realm.
One might ask, for instance, why voters seem to care more about
elections for the federal government than for local governments.
One reason is the relative costs of exit. Although it is expensive
to move from one town or state to another, the costs of moving
abroad are dramatically higher. The US annual migration rate
over the past 20 years has averaged about 15%, meaning about
1 of 7 Americans moves each year.2 But very few Americans
emigrate to another country. Local laws impact property values
and, as such, are priced by the market.3 If Illinois raises taxes
dramatically, house prices will fall as people move to Texas,
where house prices would rise. Although not everyone will
move based on such considerations, the prices are set by marginal consumers, and enough bad laws will cause people to move.
It is more difficult to avoid federal law, and therefore, it is more
important to get it right.
For governments, this feature is called federalism. The
chief virtue of a federalist model in which subnational states
have much authority over their citizens is competition. In a famous dissenting opinion, US Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis described it this way: ‘‘It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’’4
If there is uncertainty about some policy, say whether or not
government should compel insurance companies to create crosssubsidies for birth control, then allowing states to experiment
with different policy approaches reveals information about the
costs and benefits of each. This is simply a limited market for
government in the spirit of Hirschman’s duality. Massachusetts
may compel birth control coverage, while Maine may prefer
to stay out of the business of telling insurance companies what
services they must provide. Then we watch and see what happens. Later, Massachusetts, Maine, and all the other states may
take information learned from this experiment and update their
preferences about what is and what is not good policy.
In contrast, a federal policy is a single experiment that
compels compliance by the entire nation. Article VI, clause 2
of the US Constitution declares federal law ‘‘the supreme law
of the land,’’ which means it trumps any state law that directly
conflicts with or contradicts or impedes the purpose of federal
law. While federal experimentation is possible, it is more costly
to write rules governing the entire country, and change happens
more slowly. As the supreme lawmaker, however, the federal
government has other options, such as the ability to coerce states
into experimenting. In this role, the federal government could
set a targetVsay increasing the percentage of individuals with
health insuranceVand then require states to deliver that target,
in whatever way they see fit, by a certain date. As leverage, the
Supreme Court permits the Congress to use carrots and sticks
unrelated to health care, such as the withholding of federal funds
for highways, education, or the like.5
But what can we expect to happen if the federal government deploys the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution to make
one federal policy for a particular health care issue?

TWO APPROACHES TO ALLOCATING
HEALTH RESOURCES
There are two (and only two) ways to allocate all scarce resources: markets and fiat. Market allocations are made using the
price mechanism. Buyers and sellers are matched at mutually
beneficial terms by reducing their preferences to a single price at
www.pathologycasereviews.com
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which they are willing to buy or sell. The chief virtue of price is
that it encourages both producers and consumers of a product or
service to reveal information about the value of the goods or services in question.
Fiat, on the other hand, is a mechanism that works based
on hierarchy. Those higher up in a particular hierarchy make
decisions about who will do what or receive what, and these
allocations are enforced by the hierarchy. At the macroeconomic
level, this is the approach of planned economies, such as the
former Soviet Union, which had ‘‘experts’’ develop 5-year plans
for the allocation of all the resources in the entire Soviet economy. Gosplan, as it was known, was a state agency staffed by
economists, business people, politicians, and scientists from various fields. They were charged with determining the optimal way
in which everything from wheat to steel to shoes to health care
would be produced and delivered.
One danger of this approach is the fact that, despite the
experts’ confidence in their own views and the public’s confidence in them, experts are often wrong. In his book, Expert
Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?,
psychologist Philip Tetlock shows how experts often get it wrong,
sometimes spectacularly so.6 The problem is various decision
making heuristics and biasesVfor example, the confirmation
bias, the saliency or availability heuristic, and so forthVplague
experts as much as the rest of us. Experts can be subtlety led to
particular outcomes that confirm their hunches, which may not
be correct or even supported by the data. One need only pick
up the newspaper to see how scientists declare X one week and
not-X the next. In the lay press, this is known as the everythingthat-was-bad-for-you-is-good-for-you problem. Butter is better
than margarine, drinking (in moderation) is good for you, so too
is chocolate, too much exercise can kill you, and on and on and
on. More concretely, a recent news story described how scientists at Amgen, Inc, failed to replicate 47 of 53 ‘‘landmark’’ cancer studies published ‘‘in top journals, from reputable labs.’’7
Errors can be expected, so the question is whether an expertdriven approach is more likely to uncover them and reform them
than diverse approach does. Imagine 15 scientists, politicians,
and other experts tasked with making all scientific decisions
or judging which scientific discoveries to implement into policy.
Although such a top-down approach might have certain virtues
in overcoming the irrationality of crowds in some areas of science policy (perhaps global warming is such an issue, although
perhaps not), this approach probably strikes us as absurd. And
yet, as we will see in a moment, it is precisely the approach to
the allocation of health care resources taken by the Affordable
Care Act.
Another problem with an expert-driven approach is that
it can lead to complacency and dependency. The philosopher
Immanuel Kant identified the problems that flow from individuals relying on the decisions of others in his essay, ‘‘Answering
the Question: What Is Enlightenment?’’ Kant argued powerfully against paternalism and rule by expert, claiming that man
could only be truly capable of achieving his full potential when
freed to deploy individual human reason. He described humans,
then under the tutelage of church and state paternalism as like
cattle, incapable of thinking for themselves, leading to a perpetual state of immaturity and therefore abuse.
This state of unthinking and blindness is manifest as well
in leaders. A well-known chestnut to demonstrate this point is
the story of the Soviet ambassador to London, who, upon marveling at the abundance of a local bakery, asked to meet the
man responsible for ensuring the bread supply in London. Such
a question strikes capitalists as absurd, but it was perfectly sensible for someone living under Gosplan. To these people, asking
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whether government should provide a particular service, like producing, distributing, and selling bread, is completely natural,
as they cannot imagine it being produced, distributed, and sold
without government. (Many in the United States today probably
feel this about health care, where the government spends more
than all but three other countries in the world.)
But experts should not be discounted entirely, despite the
failure of every 5-year plan and communism in general. Markets
can be inefficient in some cases, and they do not always allocate
resources in socially optimal ways. Environmental externalities,
as discussed above, are the obvious exampleVso is research in
basic science, which may, for a variety of reasons, be underproduced by the market. Where market failures are identified, the
question is the best way of approaching the problem. In the environmental area, there are examples of success based on both a
price-based approach to regulation and a command-and-control
approach. To solve the problem of acid rain in the 1970s and
1980s, the EPA developed a market for tradable emissions credits
for sulfur dioxide that dramatically reduced emissions with huge
social benefits. In contrast, there may be particular pollutants,
such as arsenic or mercury, that experts can adjudge to be harmful beyond a certain level and which are best solved by simply
banning the emission of them beyond this amount.
In health care policy, the choice between markets and experts is manifest in the policy approaches favored by our two
political parties. Republican reform proposals focus on empowering individuals to make decisions (with cash subsidies for
poorer individuals) that will hopefully lead society in the direction of the optimal and efficient allocation of resources. On the
other hand, Democrats have enacted a top-down approach in
which experts will decide about who will be able to buy what
health care goods and services. The ‘‘Independent Payment Advisory Board’’ will consist of 15 voting members appointed
by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The board will be
responsible for ensuring that the growth rate of Medicare spending does not grow faster than a target rate. It will achieve this by
rationing careVthat is, deciding what health care procedures,
devices, and drugs will be available, and to whom.
This approach can theoretically achieve reductions in spending because the board could make an assessment of various
health care alternatives and decide to exclude those procedures
that are not cost-effective or not supported by strong evidence.
I am sure each of the readers can imagine circumstances in
which such an approach could be successful and beneficial at improving health outcomes or reducing costs. But I am sure each
of the readers can imagine instances in which such an approach
would have or could lead to worse outcomes. The question is
whether we trust these 15 people, subject to some but limited
oversight, to get the answers right. (For a discussion of serious
structural and constitutional issues presented by the ACA’s creation of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, see Cohen
and Cannon.8)
The expert model is not unprecedented because it is used in
other jurisdictions with some efficacy. In Germany, private health
insurance is common, but an expert agency akin to our new 15member board deems certain procedures to be unnecessary and
therefore not reimbursable. The Institute for Quality and Efficiency
in Health Care (Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im
Gesundheitswesen), which is similar to the National Institute
for Health and Clinical Excellence in the United Kingdom, investigates drugs, medical devices, and all medical treatments to determine efficacy. If the treatment is deemed not cost-effective,
then another group, a committee representing doctors, nurses, insurance companies, and hospitals, decides whether to authorize
reimbursement.
* 2012 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins
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According to a senior minister in the German Health
Ministry, ‘‘most patients and doctors usually accept IQWiG’s
recommendations.’’9 American health care policy expert Uwe
Reinhardt, who saw the IQWiG in action and marveled at its
effectiveness, told critics of the Independent Payment Advisory
Board: ‘‘Go to Germany, study [the IQWiG], and you will find
that this really worksIIt’s civilized.’’10

WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE BIRTH
CONTROL DEBATE
Can the rationing of US health care spending be civilized?
This all brings us to a very public debate about birth control. It
was not civilized, as the incident with a famous radio host insulting Ms Fluke clearly demonstrates. The question is why such
a firestorm would arise, when in fact almost every health plan
covers birth control, and most Americans have no problem with
the implicit cross-subsidy?
While birth control or some other drug, device, or procedure might not be salient for most members of the common pool,
be it insured persons or taxpayers, it may become so when the
issue becomes political. By political, I mean that the issue is decided by majority vote, crudely speaking, such that 50% plus one
of the people deciding set the rule for everyone. When the president sought to make birth control a mandatory part of all insurance plans, this was a political decision regarding health care. This
is not to disparage political decisions in general but merely to
point out this feature of themVthat they bind those who disagree.
In contrast, apolitical or market decision making involves
individuals choosing what maximizes their own interest, without
impacting others. This depends on there being choices that exist
to satisfy individuals’ preferences. Monopolies can undermine
this result. It also depends on the choices of some individuals not
harming others. If my decision to swing my fist in the air does
not impact your nose, you have little ground to complain, but if
it does, then certainly the law should speak loudly to set right the
wrong and deter future acts of this sort.
Whether political or not, the common pool always votes.
For governments, the voting is clear. For insurance companies,
the choice is made individually by buyers of insurance, but their
individual choices are aggregated at the firm level to produce a
suite of services that will be offered. Or, looking at it another
way, one can vote about what insurance plans should offer or one
can vote about which insurance to buy, thus expressing a preference for what insurance plans should be offered. Again, if there
are enough people who express a particular view, one way or the
other, about a particular service being part of the common pool,
then it will be offered by an insurance plan. In this way, the
competitive forces working on insurance companies result in a
more continuous satisfaction of individual preferences than the
dichotomous choice presented by a political calculation. There
may not be an insurance plan to satisfy everyone’s ideal basket
of services and price, but there are more of these provided by
the market than by political decision making.
With this as background, what I take from the birth control
debate is that, while the German experience may suggest that,
for that population, political decision making or expert decision
making can be effective as a means of deciding who gets what
medical care, such a policy is much more fraught in our country.
A relatively simple, low-cost, and widely accepted practice like
birth control became a firestorm when individual choice and
local variation were overridden on the grounds of improving social
welfare. The airwaves and print media were filled with analysis,
name-calling, and hyperbole. Kitchen tables, like my own, were
filled with debate about how we should vote about other peoples’
use of birth control. The reason for the intensity of the debateV
* 2012 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins
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the powerful expression of voiceVwas the fact that exit options
were dramatically limited. This was a debate about a federal rule
that would apply to everyone. Hirschman predicts intense expressions of voice, just as we saw. Just imagine what the debates
will look like when the stakes become, as they inevitably will,
whether expensive cancer therapies, surgeries, or other procedures will be paid for, or whether more controversial matters like
abortion, gender reassignment, and the like must be paid for.
We saw this in a way during the HMO boom of the early
1990s. For a period, HMOs were quite aggressive in trying to
ration care based on their assessments of the efficacy of various
health treatments. So-called ‘‘managed care’’did what it was supposed to do: the only decade since World War II that did not
see health care costs increase more rapidly than general cost of
living was the 1990s. But the system was untenable because
political leaders could not stomach the stories of people harmed
when denied care. In addition, choice was not robust among
providers and poor individuals were not given subsidies to purchase insurance. Without a flourishing market and with tragic
(but perhaps rational) cases making the nightly news, the system
became political and therefore died. Costs have therefore continued to skyrocket because the system is not designed to deliver
efficient care. The Independent Payment Advisory Board is
the purported silver bullet, but it is likely doomed by politics, and
probably unreliable regardless.
When we vote with our feet and our wallets, our preferences can be satisfied, so long as there is choice and we are not
imposing costs on others through our choices. When instead
matters are decided by votes of experts or politicians, mistakes
can be made and made in ways that necessarily are coercive.
This coercion does not admit easy exit, especially if done at the
federal level. The central lesson is that centralized power over complex matters risks making larger mistakes than decentralized
power, admits less innovation, provides for less tailored satisfaction of preferences, and generates greater political conflict, which,
ironically, may undermine the important work that the government must do to improve the world we live in.
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